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This essay is based on a speech delivered at
United Nations Headquarters on
Sept. 12, 1996 as part of the UN Department
of Public Information conference for
Non-Governmental Organizations. Portions of
this speech were also delivered on March 28,
1996 at the Annual Meeting of the American
Society of International Law in Washington,
D.C. and subsequently were published as part
of those proceedings under the title "The
United States' Financial Veto." A fully cited
version is available from the author.

-

BY

JosE E.

ALVAREZ

The United States owes at present some 73 percent
of the considerable sums of money that member states
now owe the United Nations. The U.S. debt stands
roughly at $1.6 billion. Why is the United States,
the world's richest and most powerful nation, the
UN's leading "deadbeat?"
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Some of the explanations for the
dismal state of U.S./UN financial relations
have been the subject of prior analyses
and need only be briefly addressed here:
I. Bad press, had realities. Thanks
to press reports and even some internal
UN documents, there has been constant
and persistent attention paid to
allegations of corruption, fraud, and
mismanagement within UN headquarters
and UN field offices. Some of the
difficulties have been due to mere
inefficiencies such as those stemming
from overlapping or duplicative
programs. In other instances, as with
respect to some peacekeeping missions in
Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, there have
been flawed mandates or at least
perceptions of failure . With respect to
some recent peacekeeping efforts, many
believe that the UN failed to respond
quickly, despite fair warning, thereby
allowing thousands to die in preventable
genocidal massacres.
2. The backlash to "aggressive
multilateralism." There has been a
backlash, not entirely partisan, to the
Clinton Administration's initial
suggestions that it would increasingly
resort to international organizations,
particularly the UN, when faced with
decisions to use force abroad. Faced with
accusations that it was threatening to
"sub-contract" away the national security
interests of the United States or that it
was more willing than prior
administrations to have U.S. soldiers
serve under "foreign command," the
Clinton Administration soon buried any
reference to "aggressive multilateralism."
Senator Jesse Helms, among others,
succeeded in vilifying the phrase as an
irresponsible surrendering of "national
sovereignty."
3. Balanced budget pressures. Given
recent U.S. government shutdowns, UN
policy issues in Washington, along with
virtually every other aspect of the U.S.
governments activities, have been held
hostage to an increasingly bipartisan
consensus on the need to secure a
balanced budget for the United States by
the year 2002. Impenetrable "firewalls" to
protect government expenditures relating
to foreign relations no longer exist. Today,
funding for the UN competes for scarce
funds with, for example, initiatives to put
additional police on the streets. Pitted

against domestic concerns of direct
interest to clear constituencies within the
United States, UN funding loses the
battle.
4. Lack of domestic support.
Alongside increased competition for less
money has been the continued absence
of formidable U.S. constituencies in favor
of paying UN dues. Only specific UN
programs such as UNICEF have
generated genuine grass-roots support
within the U.S. public. With the
exception of organizations such as the
UN Association, relatively few U.S.-based
organizations are inclined to mount an
offensive directed at securing money for
the general operation of the UN system.
From the perspective of those in
Congress, a vote against an appropriation
for the UN is not likely to generate
significant voter discontent.
5. UN peacekeeping budgets. In the
immediate aftermath of the Cold War,
peacekeeping expenditures authorized by
the Security Council grew at a
phenomenal rate, at one point exceeding
$3 billion annually. Such sums were more
than the amounts due the organization
for its "regular" budget. Since the U.S. is
assessed over 30 percent of peacekeeping
expenses and requests for payment of
these sums have been traditionally
included in budget requests on behalf of
the U.S. Department of State,
peacekeeping expenses emerged as an
ever larger portion of the sums due that
department. While the increases in
peacekeeping budgets have now ended,
there is heightened wariness with respect
to authorizing and financing such
ventures.
6. The end of the Cold War.
To some, since the United States "won" the
Cold War, it simply did not need to devote
as many resources to the UN. To many, the
end of the Cold War suggested an
opportunity to "turn inward" to enable the
United States to put "its own house
in order."
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IT SHOULD BE NOTED
THAT ALTHOUGH THE
MOST SIGNIFICANT
"DEADBEAT," THE
UNITED STATES IS
HARDLY ALONE.
AS OF THE END OF 1995,
NEARLY ONE-HALF OF
UN MEMBERS HAD NOT
YET PAID FOR REGULAR
BUDGET ASSESSMENTS
DUE AT THE BEGINNING
OF 1995. INDEED,
TWENTY-TWO OF
THEM HAD MADE
NO PAYMENTS AT ALL.
THE RESULTS HAVE BEEN
GRIM FOR THE UN.
EARLIER TIDS YEAR, THE
UN UNDERSECRETARY
FOR ADMINISTRATION
AND MANAGEMENT
INDICATED THAT UN
FINANCING WAS
"PRECARIOUS AND
HEADED FOR THE
BRINK."
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7. Devolution of power. Emerging
hostility toward the U.S. federal
government, amidst a move to "restore"
power to governmental units considered
"closer" to the people, has brought in its
wake a new skepticism of international
organizations. For some, including some
members of Congress, another
component of the move to restore power
to states within the United States is to
lessen the federal governments
prerogatives in "foreign bureaucracies"
like the United Nations.
8. The "democratic deficit." The
greater the perception that the UN makes
a difference, the greater is the perception
- accurate or not - that it is a de facto
"law-maker." The more the organization
is seen as "interfering" with national
decisions, the more likely the UN comes
to be regarded as a law-making
institution that should be as accountable
to representative government as other
law-making bodies. Within the United
States, the UN has come to be seen as an
increasingly potent tool of the U.S.
executive branch, particularly the
President. Accordingly, support for the
UN has increasingly become a partisan
issue between Republicans and
Democrats, with Republicans using UN
funding to make the Democratic
President more "accountable" to their
demands.
But for international lawyers, the
single most evident underlying reason for
the United States' refusal to pay its UN
dues is a ninth cause, itself the result of
1-8 above: the breakdown in the
bipartisan consensus which formerly
existed that payment of UN dues was a
legal and not merely a political obligation.
In showing the historical context for that
breakdown and its consequences, I hope
to demonstrate that these funding issues
are not "merely" a matter of an obstinate
treaty violator.

THE CURHENT
UN FlN \NCIAL CIUSJS

Since September 1995 the U.S. has
made a series of sporadic and anemic
payments to international organizations
as part of continuing resolutions that
have funded the entire federal
government. There is, as yet, no
agreement between the President and
Congress on a long term plan to finance
the UN - or for that matter the U.S.
State Department, in which such a plan
would be found.
Over the past months, the Clinton
Administration has announced plans to
ask Congress to approve a five-year plan
to pay the United States' UN arrears.
In exchange, the U.S. would insist on
elaborate UN reforms, changes in the
"capacity to pay" formula used to
determine UN regular budget assessments,
and a reduction of the U.S. share of that
budget (from 25 percent to 20 percent).
Since Congress did not fund the final two
payments of the last five-year repayment
plan, proposed by the Bush Administration, we should not be too optimistic
about this latest Clinton proposal. The
historical record of U .S./UN financial
relations suggests that Congress could
well seize upon this Administrations
proposals for UN reforms, add to them,
insist on a reduction in the U.S.
contribution, and still renege on payment
of arrears.
It should also be noted that although
the most significant "deadbeat," the
United States is hardly alone. As of the
end of 1995, nearly one-half of UN
members had not yet paid for regular
budget assessments due at the beginning
of 1995. Indeed, twenty-two of them had
made no payments at all.
The results have been grim for the UN.
Earlier this year, the UN Undersecretary
for Administration and Management
indicated that UN financing was
"precarious and headed for the brink."
He predicted that, absent a new influx of
cash, the UN would literally "run out of
cash" by the end of the year. Although
thanks to some payments by UN
members (including the United States)
the immediate forecast is not quite as
grim now, UN financing remains
precarious and staff morale is low. There
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is also considerable frustration among
both the secretariat and member states
and it is now almost uniformly directed
at the United States.

THE RISE AND FALL
OF THE
''D TY TO PAY"

For over 35 years, the United States
government, Republicans and Democrats
alike in both the executive and the
legislative branch, adhered to a bipartisan
consensus with respect to UN financing.
The United States government stated that
it believed that article 17 of the UN
Charter meant what it said: all members
owe a legal duty to pay for whatever
assessments, to be used for whatever
purpose, the collective membership
determines are owing under the UN
Charter, and no UN member can
unilaterally "pick and choose" among the
activities that the organization chooses to
fund communally. More important, the
United States acted consistently with that
belief and paid its dues in full and on
time. While, through the late 1970s, the
U.S. Congress expressed occasional
frustration with the level of U.S.
assessments, it disputed only the
application of the UN "capacity to pay"
formula for determining contributions to
the UN regular budget. On the relatively
few occasions when Congress threatened
to act unilaterally to reduce U.S.
contributions, its intent was always to
reach a maximum assessment of 25
percent - a goal, not in and of itself
unreasonable or improper under the
Charter, which the United States had
articulated before the very first General
Assembly in 1946.
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With time, other UN members came
to share the United States' legalistic view
of the "duty to pay" - even with respect
to once controversial peacekeeping
expenses. By the late 1970s, the
membership had accepted the principle
of collective financial responsibility as
had been laid out by the World Courts
opinion in the Certain Expenses Case
in 1962.
U.S. unilateral withholdings, starting
in 1979, directed at specific UN programs
(such as programs involving the PLO),
marked the beginning of a significant
change in U.S. attitudes. Particularly after
passage of the Kassebaum amendment in
1985 - which resulted in unilateral U.S.
withholdings until the organization began
adopting budgets by consensus instead of
the 2/3 vote provided for in article 18 U.S. officials began wielding a de facto
U.S. financial veto. The United States
began to shift to a more "politicized" view
of the "duty to pay."
In this decade, the use or threat of use
of the U.S. financial veto has become far
more pronounced. With variations of
most of the United States' threats to
withhold (dating from the 1980s) still in
place, new ones have emerged. Allegations
of fraud, mismanagement and waste led
to passage, in 1994, of a requirement that
the United States withhold 10 to 20
percent of UN assessed contributi.o ns
absent Presidential certification that the
UN had established an "independent
office of Inspector General" charged with
certain powers. In addition to requiring
additional consultation between the
President and Congress concerning UN
peace operations, Congress also
unilaterally reduced the U.S. share of
peacekeeping expenses from the level that
the United States had previously accepted
(30.4 percent) to 25 percent effective
Oct. 1, 1995. As Rep. Ben Gilman (R-NY)
described it, Congress was applying "a

carrot and stick approach to force
discipline on the United Nations."
Since that time, the current Congress
has seen fit to "discipline" the UN on a
continuing basis. Since November 1994,
Congress has approved numerous
conditions on financing by hefty
majorities in one or both houses. Most of
these are not law today only because of
Presidential vetoes. Many are likely to reemerge in future bills in some form.
Among the most seriously considered,
drawing support from key congressional
leaders, are 17 proposals that would:
1. prohibit or severely restrict
the placement of U.S. troops under the
"command or operational control"
of foreign nationals acting on behalf of
the UN;
2. require regular reimhursement
by the United Nations for all services,
direct or indirect, rendered by the U.S.
military, a sum estimated to be in excess
of annual U.S. peacekeeping assessments;
3. tighten up existing consultation
requirements between the Congress and
the President such that, for example, the
President would be obligated to give 15
days prior notice before the United States'
UN representative could vote in favor of
changing any peacekeeping mandate or
creating any new peace operation;
4. require specific Presidential
certifications (such as a finding that a
mission is in the "national interest" or
that U.S. intelligence information is not
compromised) prior to deployment of
U.S. troops for UN peace operations;
5. prohibit payment of U.S. assessed
or voluntary contributions to the UN if
that organization "imposes any tax or fee
on United States persons or continues to
develop or promote proposals for such
taxes or fees;"

6. require changes in UN
procurement procedures to ensure "equal
treatment" for U.S. manufacturers and
suppliers;
7. prohibit the payment of any
arrears, interest or penalties owed to the
UN as a result of the reduction to
25 percent maximum on peacekeeping
assessments;
8. reduce the U.S. share of
peacekeeping assessments to 20 percent;
9. require executive branch
certifications with respect to the
continuing effectiveness of the UNs
Office of Internal Operations;
10. prohibit any U.S. participation
in any further "world wide conferences;"
11. prohibit funding of any
organization that either performs
abortions or counsels states to change
their existing laws relating to abortion;

12. require the UN to adopt
"zero-based" budgeting such that the
organization would have to absorb costs
such as inflation;
13. require that any future
payment of arrears owed to any
international organizations "be directed
towards special activities that are
mutually agreed upon by the United
States and the respective international
organizations;"
14. require Presidential submission
of a comprehensive blueprint for reform
of the UN system;
15. condition the payment of U.S.
contributions to a particular peace
operation on changes in that mission or
other acts by the Security Council;

U.S. UNILATERAL
WITHHOLDINGS, STARTING
IN 1979, DIHECTED AT
SPECIFIC UN PROGRAMS
(SUCH AS PROGRAMS
INVOLVING THE PLO),
MARKED THE BEGINNING OF
A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE
IN U.S. ATTITUDES.
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16. require the executive branch

to seek the elimination of the arms
embargo against Bosnia in the Security
Council and if that fails, in the General
Assembly; and
17. cut U.S. contributions to the
UN to resolve debts owed by diplomatic
missions in New York City
These proposals, which have often
appeared in authorization bills for the
Departments of State or Defense but
sometimes have been the subject of freestanding bills relating to national security
or peacekeeping, are only the tip of the
iceberg. Indeed, when the Senate began
consideration of the State Department's
authorization bill (S.908), in August of
1995, over 140 amendments were
introduced. Congress is also insisting on
conditions with respect to assessments to
other international organizations.
All of these instances involved explicit
or implicit threats to withhold regular
budget, peacekeeping, or voluntary
contributions (or, often, all three) unless
Congress' conditions were met. In
addition, assessed or voluntary contributions for all international organizations
are being pitted against the funding of
favored domestic priorities with
established domestic constitutiencies with
grim results for the funding of these
organizations. Administration requests to
pay assessments in these organizations
have been repeatedly rejected out of
hand, with cutbacks justified, for
example, on the grounds of the need to
increase appropriations to the U.S.
Department of Defense. Forced to choose
among organizations, the Clinton
Administration announced that the U.S.
was withdrawing from UNIDO (United
Nations Industrial Development
Organization) and was not rejoining
UNESCO (United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization), not
because of dissatisfactions with either
organization, but due to budgetary
constraints. U.S. membership in the ILO
(International Labour Organization) just
barely escaped a similar fate.
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Today the United States is plainly not
adhering to the budgetary scheme
envisioned in the UN Charter. To most
members of Congress who must
appropriate the funds, the United States
has not a "duty" but an "option" to pay
The Clinton Administration finds that UN
payments increasingly require a policy
rationale and not simply the argument
that they are required under a treaty
obligation. The United States' new de
facto financial veto is broader than its
veto in the Security Council. While the
latter is limited to non-procedural issues
before the Security Council, the financial
veto knows no bounds. Today, no aspect
of the UN'.s operation - from the scope
of peace missions to the security of
intelligence information, from the
treatment of NGOs at UN conferences to
the use of UN insignia by U.S. troops
assigned to UN missions, from the
intricacies of UN employment practices
to its accounting procedures, from the
day-to-day operations of its Office of
Internal Operations to the treatment of
private contractors to the UN - is
immune from Congressional scrutiny and
financial threat. And, as with its Security
Council veto, the U.S. financial veto
seems effective even when merely
threatened. Both the Clinton
Administration and the UN jump through
the Congressionally-demanded hoops
once a threat gamers credible support in
Congress. U.S. leverage over the
organization seems effectively asserted
whether or not the newer threats are
actually implemented as part of U.S.
domestic law.
International lawyers and others have
made many arguments against the
exercise of this relatively new U.S.
"financial veto." We have argued that
under international law, holding the UN
hostage constitutes an inexcusable,
misguided breach of a treaty obligation
that undermines the rule of law. We have
argued that UN reforms adopted under
threat will be less effective, ephemeral
and not genuine because they are forced
upon the organization instead of arising
from true institutional learning or
multilateral cooperation. We have
complained that it is impolitic,
impracticable and arrogant for the United
States to insist that the UN become a

branch office of the U.S. Department of
State. We have criticized the U.S.
government for exhibiting to the world
the inadequacies of its diplomatic skills
through the use of such a blunt,
distasteful club. We have pointed to the
ironies of all this occurring just when the
UN seems most inclined to serve U.S.
purposes and when, through consensusbased budgeting and the United States'
legitimate Security Council veto, the U.S.
seems to have sufficient (if not already
inordinate) control over the organization.
For these reasons, many of us have
tended to see the partisan battles over UN
funding as a conflict between good and
evil, with the Republicans in the U.S.
Congress (mostly) wearing the black hats
these days.
But if our arguments are so
compelling, why are we losing the battle
for funding in the U.S. Congress?
It is wrong to suggest that
Congressional proponents of the
measures I have described are all
fundamentally hostile to continued U.S.
involvement in multilateral institutions.
While there are probably as many reasons
for these UN-bashing attempts as there
are members of Congress, for many on
Capitol Hill pulling the UN'.s purse strings
is simply a tool that "works." To most
members of Congress, exercise of the U.S.
financial veto is responsible for the new
wariness towards peace operations (by
both the Clinton Administration and the
Security Council), adherence to "zero real
growth" and now "zero nominal growth"
UN budgets, creation of the equivalent of
a UN "inspector general's" office, the
continuance of consensus-based

budgeting, closer scrutiny of the
participation rights of non-state entities,
and improvements in the international
civil service. From their perspective, it
seems odd that the same internationalists
that now bemoan threats to the UN are
often the ones encouraging sanctions on
human rights violators or the
conditioning of loans to objectionable
regimes by the World Bank. Treaty
obligations aside, many members of
Congress do not understand, from a
policy perspective, why it is okay to
sanction a state but not an international
organization.
Nor do they understand why they
are permitted to keep the U.S. executive
branch and its agencies on a financial
tether but must renounce this potent
policy tool when the executive branch
acts, as it increasingly does, in fora that
are even less transparent or accountable
to the average U.S. citizen, such as the
Security Council. Presidential candidate
Pat Buchanan may be wrong about how
to deal with the problems of the "new
world order," but he is right to suggest
that the UN imposes obligations on the
United States - apart from the duty to
pay From the perspective of many in
Congress, it is their business to scrutinize
all such obligations, along with all those
who make them, and the expenses
they entail.
UN peacekeeping raises additional
concerns. As those who have studied
Congress' repeated use of its "national
security appropriations power" would
remind us, it is not rare for the Congress
to attempt to "pull the purse strings of
the commander-in-chief." Today, when
the commander-in-chief often acts
through UN auspices, should it surprise
him (or us) if he feels the pull of
Congress nonetheless? When the UN
authorizes operations - as in Somalia,
Bosnia, or Haiti - that appear to some
members of Congress uncomfortably
close to the onset of hostilities
contemplated in the War Powers
Resolution, is it a surprise if Congress
turns to its purse-strings power to keep
these in check?

CONCLUSION

In the end, the battle over who pays
for the UN is a fight over who controls it.
This results in tensions not only between
major and small contributors but also
between the U.S. executive branch that
sets the UN's agenda and the legislative
branch that pays for it. In the United
States, the battle over who "controls" the
budget - legislature or executive - has
increasingly become part of the perennial
inter-branch struggle over who "controls"
U.S. foreign policy For some of the
participants in recent congressional/
executive squabbles over UN peacekeeping budgets, those confrontations are
an essential element of constitutionally
mandated "checks and balances" on the
waging of war.
As all this suggests, we international
lawyers should not be so confident that
we occupy the "high ground" on this
issue. We will continue to lose the
argument over UN financing so long as
many on the Hill sincerely believe that
they are exercising a constitutional
prerogative that is the equal of the
suprerriacy clause, if not its moral
superior: the duty of a legislature in a
democracy to keep law-making
institutions, whether national or
international, accountable to the
taxpayers who ultimately pay the bills.
We will lose if keeping the UN one step
away from bankruptcy continues to be
seen as the necessary price of the U.S.
separation of powers.
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